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I.  SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE  
 
Special operations forces conduct military missions in unforgiving operational 
environments.  Special operations forces routinely work in conditions of near and total 
darkness and inclement weather for extended periods of time in order to be where and 
when they are least expected.  Specialized aviation forces support their ground 
counterparts by transporting and resupplying special operations teams anywhere on the 
globe.  When additional firepower is needed, special operations aircraft can provide close 
air support from rotary and fixed wing platforms.  Special operations forces train together 
extensively to be able to succeed in any environment.    This has been true from the 
inception of special operations forces in the United States military.  Training as a joint 
fighting force is a cornerstone that the United States Special Operations Command has 
instilled in its land, air, and maritime special operations forces. 
 
A. THE ORIGIN OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE 
 
However, the nature of potential future conflicts is in flux.  While the climates 
special operations forces face may not change significantly in years to come, the nature 
and location of future conflicts may be far different from the operational environments 
our military currently prepares to face.  The way special operations forces must prepare 
for and execute missions in these changing times must also change.  While Joint Vision 
2020 and SOF Vision 2020 focus on the nature of future conflicts, current special 
operations doctrine is based on our historical experiences.  The foundational doctrine 
special operations forces adhere to is linked to a seminal event in our institutional history.  
Understanding what happened in the aftermath of the crash in Iran at Desert One in 1979 
sheds some light on how the current special operations mission planning, rehearsal, and 
execution cycle developed. 
The Holloway Commission examined the planning and execution of the military 
mission to rescue the American hostages held by the Iranian government in 1980.  The 
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report published by the commission detailed the contributing factors that led to the 
aborted rescue attempt and subsequent death of eight American military members on 
Operation Eagle Claw.  In addition to citing differences in training and operational 
limitations on similar aircraft flown by the different services, the commission identified 
the overarching desire to preserve security as a causal factor in the mission failure.  
Mission commanders practiced sections of the overall mission in phases at separate 
locations throughout the United States.  During the more than yearlong process of 
defining and refining the mission execution sequence, the entire force was never 
assembled to conduct a full-scale dress rehearsal prior to the actual mission execution.  
The commission surmised that the communication and mechanical problems the rescue 
force encountered could have been disclosed and remedied had a rehearsal been 
conducted (Kreisher, 1999). 
 
B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE TODAY 
 
Current doctrine addressing planning for special operations directly reflects this 
finding.  Special operations forces generally deploy to forward staging or operating bases 
(FSB or FOB) where they form an ad hoc organization of ground, aviation, and maritime 
forces plus maintenance and support personnel.  These organizations are called Joint 
Special Operations Task Forces.  Once assembled, the task force begins a planning cycle 
that is programmed to last 96 hours and includes integrated coordination between all 
forces involved with the mission.  The process also includes a series of mass briefings 
and a full-scale rehearsal on a practice target that replicates the actual target.  The 
primary mission plan and contingency plans are continually updated to account for 
emerging changes in the climate, political, and threat situations throughout the four day 
cycle (Joint Publication 3-05.5, 1993).  This process is exercised routinely and is used to 
prepare special operations forces to respond to real-world contingencies. 
However, as Joint Vision 2020 and SOF Vision 2020 point out, demographics and 
information access is changing the likely nature of conflict in the world.  The reduction of 
American military forces and infrastructure overseas poses logistical support issues to all 
military planners in the Department of Defense.  While the 96-hour process is a rapid 
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paced cycle to assemble and train a highly capable military force, the pace of 
international communications and information transfer through the internet and 
traditional broadcast media makes even a 96-hour process seem unresponsive.  All too 
often, commercial media provides the initial indication of a crisis to military leaders and 
the general public.  Then media attention tends to shift to coverage of potential US 
military responses; ironically, adversaries and US planners gain intelligence from the 
same public sources (Joint Vision 2020, 2000). 
The technological developments that have enabled the information age in the 
speed and fidelity of international communications capabilities are also available to 
military planners.  During the era of the hostage rescue attempt in Iran, there was no truly 
reliable method for military forces to practice their flight profiles without assembling and 
actually flying their aircraft.  Thus, there is an emphasis in the 96-hour cycle on gathering 
the Joint Special Operations Task Force in a central location where a dress rehearsal can 
be conducted.  Now, however, high-fidelity aircraft flight simulators, standardized 
electronic maps and chart data, and widespread access to a secure government internet 
allows military forces to share information without being physically collocated.  
Unfortunately, there is no doctrine or set of standardized procedures to incorporate these 
technological advances in the deployment, planning, and employment of special 
operations forces.         
 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
 
 This thesis offers a new operational concept for the deployment and employment 
of special operations forces in the United States military.  Since much of special 
operations missions rely on aviation support for transportation, resupply, and protection, 
this thesis focuses on the command and control processes associated with special 
operations aviation forces.  This thesis defines the elements of special operations aviation 
capabilities, describes the current force deployment and employment process, and 
describes an existing and innovative arrangement for the command and control of 
aviation forces.  Next, a description of a new operational concept for deploying and 
employing special operations aviation forces is offered and is followed by a short 
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preview of key technological innovations the new operational concept would warrant.  A 
set of criteria is offered by which the two command and control processes can be 
analyzed and a comparison of the current and the proposed concepts is conducted.  
Finally, a recommendation for additional research is proposed to further refine this 
concept with the goal of augmenting existing special operations doctrine. 
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II. SPECIALIZED AIRPOWER DEFINED 
 
Specialized airpower is not defined specifically in Department of Defense 
publications.  However, a description of specialized aircraft and their capabilities is 
necessary to understand the operational concepts described in this thesis.  Three of the 
four services contribute special operations forces to the United States Special Operations 
Command; the United States Marine Corps does not field special operations forces under 
the auspices of the United States Special Operations Command.  Naval Special Warfare 
Command, the United States Navy’s component to the United States Special Operations 
Command, has no organic aviation capabilities and therefore there are no naval 
organizations included in the definition of specialized airpower.   Thus, only Army and 
Air Force special operations forces are included in the definition of specialized aviation.  
Specialized aviation is defined as aerospace-related combat and combat support 
capabilities that are assigned to the United States Special Operations Command. 
 
A. UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
COMMAND 
 
The United States Army Special Operations Command has command of ground 
forces that include Army Special Forces and Rangers as well as Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations forces.  The command also includes specially modified 
helicopters and highly trained aircrew members assigned to the 160th Special Operations 
Aviation Regiment.  The helicopters encompass a mix of close air support, attack, and 
mid-range and long-range transport helicopters.  The 160th Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment conducts insertion and extraction of special operations forces, aerial security, 
armed attack, electronic warfare, and command and control support.  The weapon 
systems the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment flies includes MH-47D\E 
Chinook, MH-60K\L Blackhawk, and A\M\TH-6 Little Bird helicopters.  Most of these 
helicopters are equipped with armor plating, defensive and offensive firepower systems, 
electronic warfare gear, additional fuel tanks, and refueling probes.  The 160th Special 
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Operations Aviation Regiment aircraft are stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. 
Additionally, two small detachments from the regiment are stationed at Pacific Command 
and Southern Command.  If additional helicopters are needed, strategic airlift aircraft 
must be used for airlift support when deploying to overseas theaters of operation.  
Collectively, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment is known as Task Force 
160 (SOF Posture Statement, 2000). 
 
B. AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
 
Air Force Special Operations Command contributes the largest number of 
specialized aviation forces to the United States Special Operations Command.  Aircraft 
that Air Force Special Operations Command units operate fall into three categories: 
transportation, information warfare, and attack.   
 
1. Transportation Aircraft 
 
There are three variants of fixed wing transport aircraft in the Air Force Special 
Operations Command (AFSOC).  They are the MC-130P Combat Shadow, MC-130E 
Combat Talon, and MC-130H Combat Talon II.  The first two versions are equipped to 
conduct inflight refueling of specially modified helicopters from all services.  All three 
specialized transport aircraft are able to penetrate enemy defenses using a combination of 
low altitude flight, terrain following\terrain avoidance radar systems, adverse-weather 
penetration, and electronic warfare techniques.  The primary mission of these specially 
modified transport aircraft is to infiltrate ground teams and their equipment via airdrop 
procedures, to land on unimproved airstrips, and to resupply special operations ground 
forces once they are in the field.  AFSOC’s MH-53J\M Pave Low III\IV long-range 
helicopters perform the same roles as the fixed wing transports, plus they provide close in 
fire support and exfiltration for ground teams.   
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2. Information Warfare and Attack Aircraft 
 
Information warfare is supported in Air Force Special Operations Command by 
the EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft that broadcasts radio and television signals while 
airborne.  All of the fixed wing transport aircraft can also conduct information warfare 
support via airdrop of leaflets.  AC-130H Spectre and AC-130U Spooky Gunships are the 
primary attack weapon systems Air Force Special Operations Command employs.  These 
aircraft are equipped with infrared sensors, high-resolution television cameras, and air to 
ground beacon-tracking systems that are used to aim the 40mm and 105mm cannons 
onboard the aircraft.  The AC-130U aircraft also uses synthetic aperture radar to locate 
targets in adverse weather and has a 25mm cannon added to its armament.  The Gunships 
employ their sensors and weapons in a variety of roles including armed reconnaissance, 
close air support, and interdiction support for special operations and conventional 
missions (SOF Posture Statement, 2000). 
 
3. Locations of Air Force Special Operations Command Aircraft 
 
Air Force Special Operations Command aircraft are stationed in Europe, Asia, 
and the United States, Figure 1.  MC-130H and MC-130P airlifters with MH-53J 
helicopters are assigned at both RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom and Kadena, 
Airbase in Japan.  There are also MC-130H and MH-53J aircraft assigned at Hurlburt 
Field, Florida.  MC-130P aircraft are assigned to the 16th Special Operations Wing at 
Hurlburt Field, however the aircraft are based across town at Eglin Air Force Base in Fort 
Walton Beach, Florida.  AC-130H and AC-130U gunships are also assigned at Hurlburt 
Field.  EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft are assigned to a National Guard unit at 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and MC-130E aircraft are assigned to the Air Force Reserve 
Command and stationed at Duke Field, Florida.  All the fixed wing aircraft are capable of 
transoceanic flight, although the AC-130’s require inflight-refueling support, while the 



































































4. Additional Specialized Airpower Units       
 
Air Force Special Operations Command’s specialized airpower includes more 
than aircraft and aircrews.  Special Tactics Squadrons, the Air Force’s special operations 
ground element, provide three primary functions in support of special operations 
missions.  First, they execute control of austere airfields by conducting air traffic and 
ground control of specialized aviation forces at night, under blacked-out lighting 
conditions, and in close coordination with special operations ground force commanders.  
The personnel who are qualified to control airfields are called Combat Control Teams.  
Second, Special Tactics personnel provide combat medical care for wounded personnel 
under austere conditions.  Finally, Special Tactics Squadron members train side by side 
with the Army and Navy special operations forces.  They hold the same qualifications in 
scuba, mountaineering, extended patrolling, weapons, airborne procedures, and other 
skills as Army and Navy special operations ground forces.  While attached to Special 
Forces units or Navy Sea-Air Land teams, the Special Tactics personnel perform critical 
ground-to-air communications roles for resupply, close air support, and exfiltration 
support from conventional and specialized aviation assets.  Air Force Special Operations 
Command’s Special Tactics personnel are also capable of performing independent special 
operations missions.  There are active duty Special Tactics Squadrons located at Ft 
Lewis, Washington; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Hurlburt Field, Florida; RAF 
Mildenhall, United Kingdom; and Kadena Airbase, Japan (SOF Posture Statement, 
2000).  
This thesis does not address all the specialized aviation capabilities assigned to 
United States Special Operations Command.  For example, Air Force Special Operations 
Command has Combat Weather Squadrons and a unique unit that conducts foreign 
internal defense missions as aviation trainers that are not described here.  However, for 
the purposes of this thesis, a general understanding of the mission areas of the primary 
specialized aviation units that usually deploy as part of Joint Special Operations Task 





United States Army Special Operations Command provides specially modified 
attack and extended-range rotary wing forces to the United States Special Operations 
Command.  The Air Force Special Operations Command provides aviation forces to 
United States Special Operations Command that conduct specialized transportation, 
information warfare, and attack capabilities.  Air Force Special Operations Command 
also includes Special Tactics Squadrons that support peer special operations forces on the 
ground.  The process by which aviation forces are organized in response to crises and 
contingencies in one theater of operations is presented in the next chapter. 
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III. INNOVATIONS IN COMMAND AND CONTROL OF 
AIRPOWER 
 
Pacific Command, like every other regional theater of operations, integrates 
command and control organizations from all the services and functional commands in the 
Department of Defense.  Pacific Command, however, is unique among the theater 
commands in two significant ways. First, the sheer volume of territory in which Pacific 
Command forces are responsible for protecting America’s national interests is daunting.  
Pacific Command military units cover more than 105 million square miles of territory 
that reaches from Alaska to Hawaii to Australia to India and Madagascar.  The second 
distinction relates directly to the first; Pacific Command’s area of responsibility spans 
three of the world’s largest bodies of water.  While Pacific Command is a joint 
organization, the constraints and opportunities represented by sea power effect every 
aspect of the command’s activities including special operations activities. 
 
A. PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
 
Pacific Command executes command and control from specially designed ships 
as part of maritime task forces.  Because of the great expanses of oceans combined with a 
lack of extensive forward based United States forces throughout the theater, Pacific 
Command joint task force commanders can plan, prepare, and accomplish control of air, 
maritime, and land missions from sea.  Maneuverability and security are innate 
advantages of stationing a commander and his battlestaff on a ship.  While advances in 
military communications capabilities have made command and control from ship based 
cells possible, the limit of work and berthing space is one significant drawback to 
executing command and control from ships.  For example, planning and controlling air 
missions from a land based Air Operations Center can require upwards of 1,000 
personnel to plan future operations, coordinate with land, special operations, and 
maritime forces, control air space, and execute daily flight control.  Ships simply do not 
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have the space for the personnel and equipment needed to conduct sustained command 
and control of joint air forces. 
Two subordinate aviation command echelons in Pacific Command have addressed 
this disadvantage in separate but similar initiatives.  Pacific Air Forces, the United States 
Air Force’s aerospace component to the Pacific Command, and Special Operations 
Command, Pacific, the commander of all theater special operations forces in the Pacific 
Command, both are developing a split command and control function to support theater 
aviation missions.  Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) is building an organization of command 
and control experts based at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.  The Air Operations Center 
onboard the command and control ship will be a much smaller detachment of aviation 
planners who will focus on executing one daily flying plan at a time.  The Air Operations 
Center in Hawaii will plan and coordinate future aviation missions in the 48-hour and 
later time frames.  Both Air Operations Centers will fall under the command of the Joint 
Task Force commander and the designated Joint Force Air Component Commander.  
This forward and rear split of command and control depends on extensive coordination 
and highly reliable communication links between the command ships, the rear Air 
Operations Center, carrier based aviation units, and land based aircraft units in the 
theater.  
 
B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, PACIFIC 
 
PACAF’s Air Operations Control units are still in the initial phases of operational 
capability.  The Air Operations Center’s facilities are being constructed and personnel 
selection and training is underway.  However, the Special Operations Command, Pacific 
(SOCPAC) has established a Joint Special Operations Air Component Command.  Prior 
to the establishment of this new command and control element at SOCPAC, the 353d 
Special Operations Group of Air Force Special Operations Command was the de facto 
special operations air component commander in the Pacific theater.  However, the 
addition of a special operations aviation detachment of the Army’s Task Force 160 
helicopters in the Pacific theater led to a need to integrate a joint command and control 
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structure in SOCPAC.  The Joint Special Operations Air Component Command conducts 
planning, controlling, and coordinating functions for specialized aviation missions on 
behalf of the designated JSOTF Commander.  SOCPAC’s Joint Special Operations Air 
Component Command is a permanent organization that integrates special operations air 
missions with the Joint Force Air Component Commander’s Air Operations Center 
during joint task force operations.  This is done primarily through a Special Operations 
Liaison Element that resides in the Air Operations Center, but is under the command of 
the JSOTF Commander.  SOCPAC’s Joint Special Operations Air Component is also 
headquartered in Hawaii, but is not collocated with PACAF’s Air Operations Center. 
SOCPAC’s Joint Special Operations Air Component is sparsely staffed with 
detachments of personnel stationed in the theater alongside the specialized aviation units.  
The Joint Special Operations Air Component is headquartered in Hawaii with the 
SOCPAC staff.  The proposed manning at the headquarters element includes Air Force 
and Army rotary wing air operations planners, airspace planners, a Special Tactics 
planner, a communications and computer expert, a small administrative support section, 
and the Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander.  The Deputy Joint Special 
Operations Air Component Commander leads the detachment at Kadena Air Base, Japan 
that is resident with the 353d Special Operations Group.  This detachment has a proposed 
manning that includes Army personnel specialist, a two-person intelligence section, a 
four-person operations section, and a two-person logistics section.  The operations 
section at the Kadena detachment would include an Army rotary wing planner, an Army 
special operations ground force planner, a Naval Special Warfare planner, and the 
director of operations.  The last detachment in the SOCPAC Joint Special Operations Air 
Component organization is stationed at Osan Air Base, Korea.  Seven personnel under a 
single operations section with specialties encompassing intelligence, administration, air 
operations and plans, and logistics plans are slated to man the detachment in the Republic 
of Korea. 
SOCPAC’s standing in-theater Joint Special Operations Air Component with its 
resident detachments has a unique concept of operations.  The Joint Special Operations 
Air Component personnel will fall under the operational control of a JSOTF when 
 13
formed in response to an exercise or contingency.  If the contingency is a theater wide 
effort, the Joint Special Operations Air Component’s chain of command could lead 
directly to the theater Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander, the same 
command echelon to which JSOTFs would report.  As such, the Joint Special Operations 
Air Component would coordinate the daily interfaces with the task force Air Operations 
Centers to ensure specialized aviation support activities gain the support needed from its 
conventional airpower counterparts in the overall Joint Task Force.  Additionally, the 
standing Joint Special Operations Air Component will represent a core of regionally 
oriented experts that can act as a “docking station” (Mobley, 2001) for augmenting forces 
and their planning staffs as the JSOTF forms.  For example, according to USSOCOM 
Directive 525-8 a fully staffed Joint Special Operations Air Component would consist of 
97 personnel to enable continuous command and control of specialized aviation missions.  
The core of 31 people in SOCPAC’s Joint Special Operations Air Component and 
detachments would form the initial command and control backbone for air planning in a 
JSOTF as it transitions from daily operations to contingency response operations. 
Standing Joint Special Operations Air Component Commands, and other similar 
joint operational command and control organizations, can accomplish another important 
role.  The working relationships that can be developed by working with conventional 
theater counterparts on a routine basis can be capitalized on during contingency missions.  
This is true also of the relationships within a standing Joint Special Operations Air 
Component Command.  Since Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations experts 
would work together in SOCPAC’s detachments in Hawaii, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea, there is likely to be an efficiency benefit when bringing the three different 
services together to plan and coordinate special operations aviation missions. 
 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER IN PACIFIC 
COMMAND 
 
Pacific Air Forces Command and Special Operations Command, Pacific both 
have initiated reorganizations of their command and control of theater air assets.  Pacific 
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Air Forces, the conventional arm of the United States Air Force in the Pacific theater, has 
opted for a split command and control function with a standing Air Operations Center 
structure in Hawaii that supports forward deployed Joint Force Air Component 
Commanders air plans.  This splits the responsibilities for executing the current daily air 
tasking order in the forward area of operations from the planning and coordinating tasks 
for future daily air tasking orders in the rear area.  Along with the benefits of continuity 
and regional expertise associated with a full-time command and control organization, this 
forward-rear split reduces the number of people and amount of equipment needed to flow 
to forward operating locations.  This aspect is particularly important in Pacific Command 
since their forward operating locations are often within the limited confines of a ship. 
Special Operations Command, Pacific, the theater special operations organization 
that is a subordinate unified command for the Commander in Chief of Pacific Command, 
also established a unique command and control organization to plan and coordinate 
specialized aviation missions in the Pacific theater.  SOCPAC established detachments of 
special operations aviation mission planning and support experts in three locations 
throughout the Pacific theater.  These detachments are collocated at the home bases of the 
special operations aviation units in Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as stationing 
the command detachment of the Joint Special Operations Air Component with the 
SOCPAC headquarters in Hawaii.  All three detachments perform planning and 
coordination tasks to ensure specialized aviation missions receive the appropriate 
airspace, logistics, intelligence, information, and conventional aerospace support from 
theater and national assets on behalf of a Joint Force Special Operations Component 
Commander and JSOTF Commanders during exercises and contingencies.  In peacetime, 
SOCPAC’s Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander and the detachments 
work with the special operations forces assigned in theater to coordinate their aviation 
support requirements but report to the SOCPAC commander.
 15
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IV.  JOPES AND TIME SENSITIVE PLANNING 
 
The procedures used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and theater commanders to form 
and employ Joint Special Operations Task Forces are embodied in the Joint Operational 
Planning and Execution System and the Time Sensitive Planning Process.  A notional 
formation of a Joint Special Operations Task Force is described in this chapter by 
focusing on the actors primarily associated with the deployment of special operations 
forces assigned to a Joint Special Operations Task Force.  The VITE organizational 
analysis software package is used to relate the relevant Department of Defense levels of 
command with their actions at each stage of the Joint Operational Planning and 
Execution System.  The same VITE-based organizational analysis program is used to 
replicate the Time Sensitive Planning cycle used by Joint Special Operations Task Forces 
to plan special operations missions.  The VITE diagrams are intended to provide an 
organizational view of the special operations deployment and employment processes.   
 
A. THE JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION 
SYSTEM 
 
The President of the United States, with the advice of the National Security 
Advisor, Secretary of State, and other executive cabinet members, develops the National 
Security Strategy based on a geo-political vision of the world and America’s role in 
realizing that vision.  The President then employs economic, diplomatic, political, and 
military means, traditionally known as the instruments of national power, in shaping the 
world to achieve the National Security Strategy.   
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for identifying the roles and appropriate 
force structures needed by the military to support the National Security Strategy.  The 
first step in this process is defining a National Military Strategy that supports the National 
Security Strategy.  Theater, functional, specified, and unified military commanders base 
their assessments, operational plans, supporting plans, and force deployment schedules 
on the National Military Strategy.  The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System 
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is the process by which the Joint Chiefs and military commanders translate the National 
Military Strategy into theater campaign plans that support the National Security Strategy. 
Military commanders conduct two types of planning activities as part of the Joint 
Operational Planning and Execution System.  Deliberate Planning occurs before a crisis 
develops and results in several products used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theater 
commanders, and service staffs.  These products include an integrated force list, a time-
phased force deployment sequence, supporting plans, and a campaign plan.  Crisis Action 
Planning begins when a situation occurs that is not addressed by a previously developed 
campaign plan.  Since this form of planning is conducted in response to a real-world 
event, an Operations Plan and an Execute Order are the products of Crisis Action 
Planning.  Deliberate Planning is a proactive process and Crisis Action Planning is 
reactive.  Both planning processes are part of the overall Joint Operational Planning and 
Execution System.  The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System concludes with 
the arrival of forces and the formation of task forces to conduct military missions in 
theater (JP 5.0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 1995). 
The sequence of events and the organizations associated with deploying special 
operations forces are depicted in Figure 2.  Figure 2 also shows the association of these 
organizations with the steps in the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff initiate the deployment process in response to a National 
Command Authority tasking.  These taskings result from a theater commander request for 
forces to defuse a crisis or implement a deliberate plan.  The theater command monitors 
the deployment process and prepares to receive military forces as they arrive in theater.  
United States Special Operations Command serves primarily as a liaison between the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States Army Special Operations Command, the Air 
Force Special Operations Command, and the Naval Special Warfare Command.  These in 
turn provide planning expertise as well as special operations qualified personnel and 
weapons systems to the theater commanders.  Individual line units are the weapon 
systems—highly trained personnel combined with in-depth knowledge of their missions, 
equipment, and tactics--that conduct special operations missions.  This complex process 
of coordinating the theater commander with special operations capabilities and deploying 
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these forces can take as little as 12 hours or as long as two weeks to complete.  The 
length of time allotted to deployment is constrained by the nature of the developing 
situation in the operational theater.  All special operations forces, therefore, maintain a 



















































































































































Seal Tm 1 Seal Tm 2
SBU 1 SDV 1
CINCNCA
NSWC Coord
Seal Tm 1 Coord
NSWC Coord II
Seal Tm 1 Coord
II
NSWC Coord III
Seal Tm 1 Coord
III
NSWC Coord IV






Figure 2.  Joint Operational Planning and Execution System – Deployment Processes 
 
B. USSOCOM AND JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK 
FORCES 
 
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and sub-unified 
theater Special Operations Commands participate in the Joint Operational Planning and 
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Execution System as both supported and supporting commands.  Every regionally 
defined theater command has an integrally assigned Special Operations Command 
organization.   Special Operations Commands reflect the spectrum of special operations 
capabilities.  Officers and enlisted personnel from Air Force Special Operations, Army 
Special Operations ground and air units, and Navy Special Operations units coordinate 
theater wide training, conduct deliberate and contingency planning, and facilitate special 
operations task forces formed in their theaters. 
      There are other command elements involved with executing Deliberate and Crisis 
Action Plans with special operations forces.  These include USSOCOM’s Army, Air 
Force and Navy component headquarters and their subordinate special operations units. 
When formed in an operational theater to conduct special operations, these forces are 
organized into a Joint Special Operations Task Force.  If part of a larger Joint Task Force 
comprised of conventional military forces, the Joint Special Operations Task Force is co-
equal in authority to the Joint Task Force commander’s land, maritime, and air 
component commanders as depicted in Figure 3.  In order to coordinate special 
operations missions, the Joint Special Operations Task Force establishes several liaison 
teams that attach to the Joint Task Force’s conventional land and air components.  
Special operations missions rarely require extensive coordination with conventional 
maritime units, so formal liaison elements are not routinely established between a Joint 
Special Operations Task Force and the maritime component in a Joint Task Force.  
Alternately, if established as a separate task force in a theater, the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force reports directly to the theater commander and accepts authority 
for any attached conventional forces in addition to commanding assigned special 
operations forces. 
Joint Special Operations Task Forces organize to perform a variety of missions.  
These missions include humanitarian assistance, combat search and recovery/personnel 
recovery, special reconnaissance, close air support, armed reconnaissance, psychological 
operations, and direct action (raids, demolition, capture, etc.)  Special operations 
capabilities can be integrated with other Joint Task Force components to support their 
missions or directly by the Joint Task Force commander as a stand-alone employment 
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option.  This flexibility, combined with their small operational and logistical footprints, 
make Joint Special Operations Task Forces attractive options for theater and Joint Task 
Force commanders (JP 3-05 Doctrine for Special Operations, 1998). 
 



























































Figure 3.  Joint Task Force and Joint Special Operations Task Force Command 
Relationships 
 
C. TIME SENSITIVE PLANNING  
 
The special operations mission planning process is known as Time Sensitive 
Planning.  Four days after receiving a Warning Order from a joint task force commander, 
special operations forces can be prepared to execute a joint service, rehearsed special 
operations mission that incorporates air, ground, and maritime forces plus the requisite 
command and control of all assigned special operations and conventional forces.  This is 
possible because USSOCOM and its component organizations adhere to a time 
sequenced procedure that begins with the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) 
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commander receiving a Warning Order.   The special operations commander designates a 
Mission Planning Agency from one of the special operations elements assigned to the 
JSOTF.  The rest of the task force becomes Mission Support Agencies for that particular 
mission.  The Mission Planning Agency then conducts Mission Analysis, drafts a 
Concept of Operations, develops Courses of Action, and begins detailed Mission 
Planning including a Mission Rehearsal.  The agencies and the steps involved in the Time 
Sensitive Planning, informally known as the 96 Hour Planning Cycle, are highlighted in 
Figure 4.   
The JSOTF staff supports the Mission Planning Agency by providing planning 
guidance and coordinating an integrated Operations Order between the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force elements within the task force.  Additionally, the service commanders assigned 
to the JSOTF participate in the Course of Action selection with the JSOTF commander.   
Air support for special operations missions is arguably the most complex aspect 
of planning and executing special operations missions.  Specialized air support missions 
range from insertion, resupply, and exfiltration of ground and maritime teams to armed 
reconnaissance, interdiction, escort, and close air support from radio, television, and 
pamphlet based psychological operations to in-flight helicopter refueling, field medical 
trauma care, long-range, secure ground to air communication, and control of austere 
landing, extraction, and drop zones.  The Joint Special Operations Air Component 
Commander is the agent within the JSOTF who is responsible for coordinating all 
specialized air support for special operations missions. 
The ground teams and aircrew members who will actually participate in the 
mission conduct Detailed Mission Planning together.  This is where the bulk of Air 
Support Requests originate.  Extensive coordination occurs between the participants as 
planning progresses.  Rehearsals include "static" or ground practices followed by a flying 
rehearsal of as many parts of the mission as practical.  These rehearsals allow participants 
and mission commanders the opportunity to hone the execution sequence, identify critical 
events, and determine the overall chance of mission success.  Additionally, rehearsals 
allow commanders to exercise contingency plans like Combat Search and Rescue 
procedures, simulated battle damage to aircraft, and casualty care/evacuation plans. The 
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next step in the Time Sensitive Planning process is to critique the mission plan based on 
lessons learned from the rehearsal, revise the plan as necessary, and reconstitute the force 
while awaiting an Execute Order (JP 3-05.5 Joint Special Operations Targeting and 
Mission Planning Procedures).   
 
D. THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMPONENT 
COMMANDER 
 
The Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander initiates coordination 
activities when the Mission Planning and other Mission Support Agencies generate Air 
Support Requests.  These coordination activities include identifying aircraft configuration 
and aircrew requirements, airspace reservations, in-flight refueling needs, weather and 
communication support, Combat Search and Rescue/Personnel Recovery options, and 
other aviation support such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, escort aircraft, 


























































Figure 4.  Special Operations Forces--Time Sensitive Planning 
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issues an Air Support Confirmation for each approved Air Support Request.  The details 
of unsupportable Air Support Requests are negotiated between the Joint Special 
Operations Air Component Commander’s staff and the Mission Planning and Support 
Agency to resolve conflicts.  The Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander’s 
objective is to maximize specialized air support to the JSOTF’s missions. 
 
E. JOPES AND TIME SENSITIVE PLANNING REVIEWED 
 
The JOPES force deployment process is designed to provide an orderly transfer of 
military capability from a peacetime posture to a crisis or contingency response footing.  
The process originates with the President identifying the National Security Strategy from 
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Military develop a National Military 
Strategy.  Unified theater and functional commanders devise Operational and Supporting 
Plans to address likely contingencies as part of the Deliberate Planning cycle.  Crisis 
Action Planning is the part of the JOPES process that responds to unforeseen 
international events.   
JSOTFs form in theaters of operation under the authority of theater commanders 
or Joint Task Forces commanders.  Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations forces 
assigned to support a theater commander report to the JSOTF commander.  These special 
operations forces follow the Time Sensitive Planning process that integrates air and 
ground components in the task force to produce a thoroughly conceived and rehearsed 
plan of operations.  Although designed to take four days, omitting or compressing stages 
in the current planning cycle can accelerate the 96-hour sequence.  Execute Orders rarely 
arrive at the 96-hour point, so the JSOTF continues to refine the plan until it is executed 
or the crisis diffuses.   
This methodology is followed by the Department of Defense to assemble and 
prepare special operations forces to conduct operational missions.  While DoD’s JOPES 
and special operations’ Time Sensitive Planning processes can be completed quickly in 
comparison to the time it would take to assemble and prepare a similar conventional force 
for combat, the changing nature of the future global environment may make the current 
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process seem to be too slow.  The timeliness of military responses to crises is dictated not 
only by the distance to the conflict, but also by the speed of the current JOPES and 
special operations mission planning processes.  Responsive is further hindered by the ad 
hoc nature of JSOTFs themselves.  Attempting to establish internal and external working 
relationships while simultaneously trying to take into account the limitations and 
opportunities inherent in each theater of operations can cause delays in mission planning.  
The following chapter introduces a new special operations organization and concept of 
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 The Theater Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) operational 
concept differs in several ways from the current Time Sensitive Planning process 
currently in use by special operations forces.  Rather than forming the aviation planning 
and command cell after a JSOTF forms as is currently done, the Theater JSOAC concept 
proposes that a full time core of command and control experts, the Theater JSOAC staff, 
reside in each regional theater of operations.  The Theater JSOAC would report to the 
commander of the theater Special Operations Command on a day-to-day basis.  The 
Theater JSOAC would coordinate the initial phases of the current Time Sensitive 
Planning cycle during crisis or contingency responses as home-based aircraft begin 
flowing towards staging bases in the theater.  Rather than tasking the primary aircrews to 
ferry their own special operations aircraft to an intermediate staging base (ISB), the 
primary aircrews would stay home and begin planning under the direction of the Theater 
JSOAC.  Non-mission aircrews would deploy the aircraft to the theater.  The non-mission 
aircrews would remain at the ISB(s) as a reserve in case one of the mission aircrew 
members fell ill.  If not needed to fill in on the primary mission, the ferry crews would be 
available to return the aircraft to their home bases after the mission.  Mission aircrews 
would arrive in theater on follow-on military or commercial airlift after the aircraft arrive 
at the ISB(s). 
 This process is conceptualized and contrasted with the current JOPES and Time 
Sensitive Planning process in the following series of diagrams. The figures depict the 
sequence of a notional deployment of special operations aviation and ground forces to the 
European theater of operations.  In the scenario, a crisis occurs on the European continent 
that necessitates an evacuation of American citizens.  The JOPES and Time Sensitive 
Planning process is shown in the first set of figures.   
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C. JOPES DEPICTION 
 
Figure 5 shows liaison personnel from several special operations units in the 
United States and Europe meeting at Special Operations Command-Europe, or SOCEUR, 
after the National Command Authority decides to implement a course of action featuring 
special operations forces.  The liaisons work with the SOCEUR planners to develop 
specific courses of action and force lists of special operations and conventional support 
units required to evacuate the American citizens.  One of the first decisions the SOCEUR 
staff must make is the location of a suitable pre-mission staging base.  Once selected, 
advanced echelons, or ADVON, forces of logisticians, contractors, weapon systems 
planners, and security force personnel fly to the forward operating base (FOB) to begin 
preparations to receive the main air and ground special operations forces.   
SOCEUR requests that the National Command Authority issue deployment 
orders, Figure 6, for the necessary aircraft and ground forces to assemble at the selected 
forward operating base.  Also, the JSOTF commander is selected and a battlestaff 
composed of representatives from SOCEUR and the deploying units forms at the forward 
operating base.  The battlestaff refines the preliminary courses of action while aircraft, 
aircrew, and support personnel arrive at the forward operating base.  Continuing 
developments from the crisis area are incorporated into the Time Sensitive Planning 
process.   
Figure 7 focuses on the Time Sensitive Planning sequence followed at the forward 
operating base.  The JSOTF commander selects the specific course of action the 
battlestaff believes will offer the best opportunity for success with the minimum degree 
of acceptable risk.  Next, special operations air and ground forces work together to 
integrate their separate parts of the overall mission.  Subordinate task forces of special 
operations units are organized to accomplish supporting tasks. For instance, Task Force 
Red might be charged with the responsibility of seizing and controlling an airfield at 
Target “B” while Task Force Grey might have the job of transferring American citizens 
from a rally point at Target “A” to Target “B”.  Optimally, a full-scale flying rehearsal of 
the whole plan is conducted away from the crisis area following extensive briefings and 
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contingency planning.  Once confident that the special operations task force is 
sufficiently prepared to accomplish the actual mission, the JSOTF commander requests 
authorization to execute the rescue operation.  The Time Sensitive Planning process ends 
with the recovery of JSOTF aircraft, aircrew, and ground personnel back at the forward 
operating base. 
 
C. THEATER JSOAC DEPICTION 
 
The Theater JSOAC concept of operations begins in the same way as the 
combined JOPES and Time Sensitive Planning process.  Figure 8 shows liaisons from the 
same units meeting at SOCEUR in response to the National Command Authority’s 
selection of a special operations response to the fictional crisis in Europe.  However, 
rather than establishing a forward operating base close to the crisis area, SOCEUR 
planners send ADVON elements to separate intermediate staging bases.  Ideally, these 
bases would be located at existing military airfields that the added special operations 
forces could use as a cover for their presence in Europe.   
 Figure 9 illustrates the simultaneous deployment and synthetic planning steps at 
the heart of the Theater JSOAC concept.  Non-mission aircrews fly the fixed wing special 
operations aircraft to the separate staging bases.  Helicopters are shipped by strategic 
airlift to one of the intermediate staging bases.  In this example, specialized transport 
aircraft and helicopters assemble at an existing United States airfield in England while 
psychological operations, fire support, and other support aircraft assemble elsewhere in 
theater.  Mission aircrews at their home stations begin mission area familiarization and 
initial planning under the direction of the Theater JSOAC at SOCEUR.  Specialized 
aviation units use full motion aircraft simulators, mission rehearsal devices, or 
computerized mission planning, modeling, and simulation systems and standardized 
mission data from the Theater JSOAC to prepare for the evacuation mission.  Once it 
appears the mission will likely continue to the execution phase, ground forces deploy to 
ISB “A” to rendezvous with the specialized transport aircraft.  Mission aircrews are also 
flown by commercial transportation or military transport to join their aircraft at ISB “A” 
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and ISB “B”, respectively.  The JSOTF and JSOAC battlestaffs more than likely would 
flow to the ISB with the preponderance of forces.  However, since the Theater JSOAC 
concept is based on distributed command and control, the JSOTF and JSOAC battlestaffs 
do not need to be collocated to accomplish special operations missions.  
Finally, Figure 10 shows the mini-rehearsals conducted at the ISBs under the 
direction of the JSOTF.  Once the execute order is given, aircraft depart from the ISBs in 
sequence to arrive at Target “A” and Target “B” with their subordinate task forces.  A 
recovery base is established near the crisis area manned by maintenance personnel, 
security forces, and a command element as the assault forces launch from the ISBs.  The 
recovery base can serve as an emergency landing base for special operations aircraft, a 
launching base for search and recovery forces, or as a transload and refueling location 
following the evacuation mission.  Once the evacuation mission is complete, special 
operations ground and air forces would return to the ISBs or the recovery base.   
 
D. THEATER JSOAC OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
 
The Theater JSOAC process of deploying and employing specialized aviation 
forces is more than a new command and control proposal.  It offers commanders of 
theater special operations commands a faster process for applying specialized airpower to 
respond to crises and contingencies.  Rather than forming an ad hoc command and 
control organization at the same time special operations air and ground forces are 
forming, the Theater JSOAC concept establishes the command and control nucleus 
around which specialized airpower can coalesce.  This nucleus will bring a regional 
awareness and stronger working relationships that can expedite the planning and 
execution phase of a crisis or contingency response.  The concept relies on and leverages 
the expanded global communications capabilities throughout the Department of Defense.  
Information will be distributed to special operations forces in and out of theater through 
secure electronic mail, telephone, message traffic, and DoD’s internet.  In addition, the 
ability to link flying simulators together so that aircrews in separate locations can 
rehearse their missions together synthetically will significantly increase the fidelity of
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 mission preparation efforts. Using simulators to practice operational missions rather 
actually flying the aircraft also allows maintenance personnel additional time to preserve 
the aircraft for the real mission.  Furthermore, command and control software systems 
with a simulations capability will allow JSOAC commanders to rehearse contingency 
options and prepare the battlestaff to execute the command and control functions during 
the real mission.  In summary, the Theater JSOAC operational concept provides highly 
capable and well-prepared specialized aviation forces to execute special operations 
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VI.  THEATER JSOAC SOFTWARE SYSTEMS 
 
Modeling and simulation of combat represents an area of technological innovation 
that could enable the Theater JSOAC concept of operations.  While all four services 
utilize models and simulations to test doctrinal concepts and analyze proposed force 
structures, the use of computer systems to evaluate alternate courses of action, conduct 
mission rehearsals, and execute command and control of operational forces is an 
emerging concept in the Department of Defense.  Special operations forces do not yet 
routinely use computerized models and simulations for operational command and control 
purposes.  However, some existing models, simulations, and flight planning systems are 
potential command and control tools for Theater JSOACs. 
Since the Marine Corps and United States Special Operations Command share 
some similarities in organization and mission areas, an examination of the way the 
Marine Corps incorporates computer-based modeling and simulation may yield useful 
insights for special operations commanders.  The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical 
Warfare Simulation may be adapted for use by Theater JSOAC planners. Other military 
models and simulation software are also available in the Department of Defense that 
replicate adversary and friendly weapon systems.  One such software system is called the 
Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation System.  An aircraft flight planning software 
package is a third type of software program that could potentially be used as a command 
and control tool by a Theater JSOAC.  The Special Operations Forces Planning and 
Rehearsal System incorporates features that make it attractive to specialized aviation 
mission planners.  A review of the structure and features of these software systems can be 
useful in determining the requisite qualities of a command and control software system 






A. MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE WARFARE 
SIMULATION 
       
The Marine Corps uses a computer based warfare simulation software package to 
train Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders and battle staffs on their 
wartime duties.  The software, called the MAGTF Tactical Warfare Simulation or 
MTWS, is a map-based wargame that simulates the characteristics of friendly, neutral, 
and enemy maritime, amphibious, ground, and air combat elements.  An operator using 
the MTWS program can define missions for virtually every aspect of combat a MAGTF 
could encounter.  MTWS operators input the locations, dispositions, and actions of the 
actual and simulated combat units then report simulated battle results back to the 
MAGTF commanders and exercise referees.  MAGTF battle staff’s have to assess 
changing combat situations based on the same information presented in the same formats 
the MAGTF would receive if the Marines were involved in actual combat.  MTWS 
accomplishes this level of realism by generating US Message Text Formatted reports 
based on simulation results.  MTWS can also electronically distribute the message traffic 
to command echelons participating in the exercise either directly or via the Global 
Command and Control System.  In this way, Marine Corps command elements gain high 
fidelity training in their combat missions. 
 
1. MTWS Structure 
 
      As Scrivener (2000) points out, MTWS, although not difficult to learn, is a 
complex system that is not always intuitive.  MTWS is based on the UNIX operating 
system and consists of a local area network of dedicated computer servers and operator 
workstations.  The workstations, however, can function under the Windows operating 
system.  There are three classes or functions of computers in the MTWS network.  The 
main terminal is called the MTWS System Control or MSC.  The MSC is the heart of 
MTWS and links the workstations to the databases and administrative functions.  The 
MTWS Application Network or MAN, can number between one and seven workstations 
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that process the simulation computations.  Adding additional MAN workstations allows 
simultaneous processing to occur and is useful on larger scale exercises and simulations 
to preclude processor overload.  The third class of computers is the user interface into the 
simulation, which is called an MTWS Display Station, or MDS.  MTWS can support up 
to 75 MDS workstations each having separate user privileges to access different forces.  
For example, MTWS allows the operator to select which messages are received by each 
specific MDS.  All three of these MTWS computers are UNIX- based.  The MTWS 
Advanced User Interface, MAUI, is the only portion of MTWS that is accessible via the 
Windows operating system.  The MAUI is actually a software application that resides in 
the memory of a Windows-based personal computer attached to the MSC by an ethernet 
network.  Computers with MAUI loaded on them serve the same function as the MDS 
computers. 
      The MAUI and MDS are the main interfaces Marine Corps exercise planners use 
to input data into the MTWS simulation.  Marine ground units can be defined in details 
that include ammunition, weaponry, method of transportation, effects of fatigue, etc.  Air 
units are organized by aircraft type and mission, standard configuration loads of 
armament, and even fuse settings on bombs and missiles.  Amphibious units can be 
similarly defined using the MAUI or MDS interface.  Additionally, airfields can be 
“built” by MTWS users and aviation units can be assigned to use the airfields as home 
bases.  MTWS provides the ability to construct man-made objects such as minefields, 
roads, and bridges using operator-defined civil engineering units, as well. 
 
2. MTWS Features 
       
All the MAUI interfaces can be accessed using a combination of list windows, 
text-entry fields, and mouse-on-map clicking.  List windows open automatically and offer 
the MAUI user a list of allowable variables for a given text entry field.  Text entry fields 
allow the MTWS operator to input unique names for elements such as units and airfields.  
Mouse-on-map clicking is the most useful technique for defining geographical locations 
by latitude-longitude or military grid reference system.  For example, using MAUI a unit 
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can be defined by listing the “legal” unit types, typing in a name for the unit, and then 
placing it in the MTWS virtual world by mouse-clicking on the map (Scrivener, 2000).  
Once defined, units can be assigned missions to accomplish based on their unit types and 
capabilities.  Units are selected and “commanded” in MTWS using similar lists, text 
entry, and mouse pointing interfaces as the ones used to create the simulated units.       
 The ability to coordinate mission events relative to an H-hour is another useful 
feature of MTWS.  An artillery barrage, for example, can be scheduled to begin 1 hour 
prior to an H-hour and end after ten minutes.  Aircraft attacks could last from H-hour 
minus 50 minutes to H-hour minus 30 minutes.  Advance echelons of combat engineers 
could clear obstacles from H-hour minus 25 minutes to H-hour minus 5 minutes. Next, a 
wave of amphibious assault vehicles can be scheduled to reach a beachhead at H-hour.  
Finally, follow-on reinforcements could be slated to arrive an hour after H-hour.  Using 
an H-hour in MTWS is one way that MAGTF’s coordinate actual missions.  Marine 
Corps planners can better determine the optimal time for execution during the planning 
phase, while also deconflicting individual unit portions of the overall mission, by using 
H-hours with MTWS simulations (Scrivener, 2000). 
       MTWS allows operators to suspend a simulation and store it for later replay.  This 
allows mission planners to develop several variations using the same basic set of forces 
and geography.  Rather than having to start from the beginning each time, a planner need 
only recall a previously saved mission, make whatever changes are warranted, and save 
the edited version as a new simulation.  Mission success factors like casualties inflicted 
and incurred, sorties flown, resources used, etc. for each simulation are reported to the 
operator by MTWS.  These capabilities in MTWS permit planners to evaluate different 
courses of action for friendly, neutral, and enemy forces and determine the course of 
action that offers the best chance of mission success (Garrabrants, 2001). 
      Marine Corps commanders can also use MTWS to rehearse a battle staff’s 
responses to contingency situations.  Ideally, the course of action selected by the MAGTF 
staff would account for the enemy’s most likely counter-actions balanced against the 
enemy’s most dangerous option.  However, MAGTF commanders still face uncertainties 
and their battle staffs benefit from training to react to less likely, yet still irksome events.  
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Operators can make real-time inputs into a mission profile while a simulation is running 
in MTWS.  Operators portraying opposition forces, or OPFOR, can also make real-time 
inputs to the scenario.  For example, a Marine commander who wants to exercise a search 
and rescue contingency during an MTWS simulation, can direct the OPFOR operator to 
“shoot down” a friendly aircraft.  MTWS will remove the aircraft from the simulation, 
generate the appropriate report, and the MAGTF battle staff would have to respond to the 
aircraft loss.  If the MAGTF commander wishes to, he can also direct the MTWS 
operators to halt the execution in order to reinforce a lesson or correct a mistake made by 
the battle staff.  The ability to interact with the simulation on a real-time basis is a key 
strength of the MTWS system (Blais). 
 
3. SOF-MTWS Interfaces 
       
Many of MTWS’ attributes are applicable to the JSOTF mission planning and 
execution process.  For instance, one special operations mission is to conduct airfield 
seizures for use as staging areas for non-combatant evacuation or other follow-on 
operations.  The ability to construct and name airfields on the electronic map in MTWS 
supports this type of special operations mission.  MTWS also allows the operator to 
modify the generic capabilities of aircraft already defined in the simulation thereby 
creating new aircraft with specific performance characteristics.  JSOAC planners can 
group these unique aircraft into formations named by call signs or squadron names.  
Using an H-hour also controls timing on special operations missions.  Since MTWS can 
be used as a means of determining alternate courses of action, JSOAC commanders can 
weigh the costs and benefits of employing special operations forces in different 
combinations to accomplish the same mission.  Simulating neutral and enemy forces is 
also an important consideration in planning special operations mission since many such 
operations take place in urban and developed areas.  A non-combatant evacuation for 
instance, is a mission that involves potential interaction with hostile and civil forces.  
Finally, since special operations forces usually operate with minimal assets, JSOTF battle 
staffs must be able to generate efficient and accurate responses to contingencies to 
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preserve chances for mission success.  The ability to rehearse a JSOAC battle staff with 
the MTWS system improves the likelihood of making better command decisions during 
real missions. 
 
4. MTWS Summary 
       
Special operations forces rely on unconventional factors to achieve mission 
success in asymmetric combat situations.  Whereas conventional forces employ mass and 
maneuver to generate combat power, special operations combat power is derived from 
the unique weapon systems combined with highly trained special operators.  Special 
operations personnel purposely execute missions in weather and terrain conditions that 
conventional forces do not fare well in.  However, MTWS does not reflect special 
operations combat strengths in the simulation.  Although using weather as a 
camouflaging technique to mask aircraft movement and delay detection is modeled by 
MTWS (Blais), there is no adjustment made for special operations forces ability to 
successfully operate in difficult terrain and inclement weather.  Conventional forces with 
superior firepower, albeit inferior morale, mission focus, and tenacity would routinely 
defeat special operations forces in a MTWS simulation.  This is the key issue 
underpinning a JSOACs potential reluctance to accept MTWS as a useful mission 
planning and course of action evaluation tool.  
 
B. JOINT CONFLICT AND TACTICAL SIMULATION SYSTEM 
 
The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation System (JCATS) is a wargaming 
software package that models a wide range of military capabilities.  Air combat, land 
warfare, and both surface and subsurface naval warfare are represented in this simulation.  
Operators can control individual vehicles and soldiers on a digitally based map and 
terrain presentation.  Vehicles include ships, aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, rocket 
launchers, helicopters, fighting vehicles, submarines, etc.  Soldiers can be defined to 
reflect different types of infantry abilities based on the equipment they carry.  These 
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weapons include claymore mines, rifles, grenades, and sensing devices in addition to 
body armor and headgear.  Ancillary equipment is also included in the simulation such as 
surface and air radars, airfield control towers, and enhanced buildings that soldiers and 
vehicles can enter and interact with in the simulation.  For example, depending on the 
structural qualities of a building, a vehicle can breach the walls by firing a round at it or a 
soldier can create an opening with an explosive charge.   
 
1. JCATS Features 
 
JCATS allows the user to group soldiers and vehicles into more complex weapon 
systems.  These complex weapon systems can then be assigned to one of ten task forces 
per side in the simulation.  There are three sides that are represented in JCATS: friendly, 
enemy, and neutral.  For instance, dismounted infantry can be paired with a fighting 
vehicle and several fighting vehicles can be combined with scout and attack helicopters 
and organic artillery assets to form the core of a mechanized infantry unit.  These units 
can be named as a task force and issued commands by the operator as an aggregate or 
elements can be controlled individually.  This ability to define military units from the 
bottom up, allows users to reflect the variety of organizations found in the real military. 
JCATS includes some useful mission planning and preparation tools in addition to 
the force organization tools.  Commands issued to units can be keyed to the system clock, 
so actions of separate units or entities can be coordinated to occur simultaneously or in 
sequence.  Routes can also be defined with delay points, activities, defensive postures, 
rules of engagement changes, and set speed of movement plus other options.  Once 
defined, routes can be saved, named, and copied for use by other vehicles or formations.  
Another aspect of planning that JCATS models is detection rings and line of sight fans.  
These field of view wedges can be displayed on the JCATS map presentation and 
centered on an entity or group.  The detection distances are based on the digitally derived 
terrain elevation and the sensor characteristics of the selected weapon system.  So, a tank 
with an infrared sensor will have a smaller fan than an aircraft with an onboard radar 
system.  
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Two additional sets of tools or attributes, which are integral to the conflict aspect 
of JCATS, are the acquisition and attrition routines.  Acquisition is based on detection 
rings and line of sight orientation and is classified in one of four levels.  The levels range 
from basic detection of another entity, classification of the detected object into a generic 
description like tracked vehicle, recognition as to a specific type of object, and finally 
identification as to allegiance of the object.  Attrition is defined within JCATS by a 
combination of factors that include armor, range, armament or warhead, and detection.  
The lowest level is suppression, which equates to placing an entity into a fully defensive 
mode.  The next level is a firepower or mobility kill.  Firepower kills prevent an entity 
from offensively firing its associated weapons yet still allows the unit to maneuver. 
Mobility kills on the other hand allow firing weapons but not movement.  Catastrophic 
kills combine firepower and mobility kills. 
 
2. JSOAC Application of JCATS 
 
Joint Special Operations Aviation Component Command planners can use these 
aspects of JCATS to prepare to support JSOTF missions.  Individual specialized aviation 
aircraft can be defined in JCATS based on their real world capabilities.  For instance, 
unrefueled flight duration, fuel storage capacities, and fuel burn rates can all be set so that 
an aircraft’s performance is accurately portrayed in the simulation.  Planners can also 
define characteristics of Special Tactics Teams, such as radios, night vision gear, 
weapons, and ammunition loads.  Once defined, groups of aircraft such as long-range 
helicopters and low-level transport planes can be associated into flights of aircraft.  
Special Tactics Teams and other special operations ground forces can also be grouped 
into units.  Next the planner can use JCATS to mount the ground force troops onto the 
helicopters and transports.  Planners can also use the simulation to pre-plan movement 
routes for the helicopters to reach landing zones and aircraft to reach airfields or airdrop 
zones.  Planners can then dismount the ground forces by parachute or by walking off the 
helicopters and aircraft.  JCATS can next be used to define ground routes with delays at 
specific nodes to conduct defensive or offensive combat operations.  Helicopters and 
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aircraft can finally be used as exfiltration platforms by having the troops mount the 
helicopters and aircraft for the return flights. 
These are the basic functions associated with specialized aviation assets.  JCATS 
can also be used to simulate other specialized aviation assets like close air support and 
interdiction fires from AC-130 aircraft and MH-53M, MH-60DAPS, and AH-6 
helicopters.  Special operations aviation planners can do this by defining the respective 
armament on each weapon system.  These aircraft can then be assigned separate routes 
that parallel the transport helicopters and aircraft or they can be assigned routes directly 
to ground targets.  Other functions such as flights of psychological warfare aircraft are 
easy to model in JCATS, also.  However, the effects of psychological warfare such as 
radio and television broadcasts and leaflet airdrops are not modeled in JCATS.  Once the 
planners initiated the simulation, the JCATS entity acquisition and attrition models would 
detect enemy and neutral entities and compute the effects the specialized aviation assets’ 
weapons have on the entities.   
JCATS also supports course of analysis selection.  Planners can construct any 
number of alternate sets of aircraft formations, flight routes, and activities to accomplish 
the same objective.  Planners can then run the simulation repeatedly and observe the 
results in terms of detection and attrition of the specialized aviation forces.  The 
cumulative results from these alternate sets of mission formations can also be compared 
against each other to determine, based on the JCATS simulation, which approach that is 
likely to yield the least friendly casualties, the highest chance of success, or requires the 
minimal number of assets.  In order to appropriately assess the alternate courses of action 
for specialized aviation forces, which is highly dependent on the special operations 
ground force elements scheme of maneuver, it is important that all alternate options be 
judged against the same enemy order of battle and environmental conditions.   
However, once the specialized aviation commander selects a course of action, 
JCATS can further be used to refine the plan by altering the environmental conditions 
and enemy disposition in the simulation.  Since JCATS is inherently designed to be used 
in a computer network environment, synthetic inter-theater and intra-theater mission 
preview can be conducted by the in-theater specialized aviation component with mission 
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aircrews at their home stations.  The special operations aviation planners, who will serve 
as the battle staff during the execution phase of a special operations mission, can use 
JCATS to rehearse their responses to unpredictable events.  For example, an aircraft can 
be “shot down” in the JCATS simulation and the battle staff would then have to rehearse 
their search and recovery options while determining whether the mission is still viable.  
This aspect of JCATS is perhaps its greatest strength as a command and control software 
tool. 
 
3. JCATS Summary 
 
These factors support a Joint Special Operations Aviation Component use of the 
JCATS simulation as a command and control aid in planning and rehearsing the aviation 
support to special operations missions.  Yet JCATS has limiting factors as well.  
Although, JCATS will run on desktop and laptop systems, it is based on the Red Hat 
Linux operating system.  Although some computer systems are dual-bootable with Red 
Hat and Windows operating systems, Red Hat is not in widespread use throughout the 
Department of Defense in general or among special operations forces, specifically.  
Furthermore, JCATS is based on a client-server computer architecture and is sufficiently 
complex that a system administrator would be required at each location, deployed and 
home station, where JCATS would be installed.  In other words, mission planners could 
not likely fulfill the dual roles of weapons systems experts and JCATS system 
administrators.  Also, the route files, flight performance data, and enroute time 
calculations that JCATS produces are incompatible with flight and mission planning 
software tools currently used by specialized aviation units.  This means that the aircrews 
would have to manually translate the JCATS routes into suitable formats of position, 
speed, and direction of flight that will work in both the approved mission planning 
software and the aircraft’s mission computers.  There are other less troublesome aspects 
to JCATS utility as a specialized aviation command and control tool, yet the inability of 
the system to directly translate routes of flight into existing software mission tools would 
result in more time spent on “administrative” data conversion and entry instead of 
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mission planning and rehearsal by the mission aircrews.  Although, this may be a 
seemingly insignificant detail, the opportunity for transcription and translation errors 
coupled with the need to maintain separate mission-planning systems combine to mitigate 
the usefulness of JCATS as an optimum command and control tool for specialized 
aviation missions.   
 
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PLANNING AND 
REHEARSAL SYSTEM 
 
The Special Operations Forces Planning and Rehearsal System is another 
software package that could potentially serve as a command and control tool for Joint 
Special Operations Air Components.  Although the name implies an application to 
ground, maritime, and aviation aspects of special operations forces, the Special 
Operations Forces Planning and Rehearsal System (SOFPARS) is primarily an aviation-
planning program.  SOFPARS is certified by United States Special Operations Command 
for use as a flight and mission planning software system for use by Air Force and Army 
Special Operations Aviation units.  The SOFPARS program, like the other software tools 
previously introduced, uses a map-based presentation along with terrain elevation data to 
plan individual and formation flights.   
 
1. SOFPARS Structure 
 
Since it was designed to function as an automated flight planning system, 
SOFPARS includes several databases that relate directly to flying.  These databases 
include airfield and radio navigation aid information files available from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA).  Aircraft performance data are stored in separate 
databases in SOFPARS.  Individual aircraft are modeled in SOFPARS according to their 
characteristics such as fuel capacity, fuel burn rates, climb rates, airspeeds, and cargo 
carrying capacity.  Flight planning involves determining a route of flight, selecting an 
altitude to fly, choosing an airspeed and computing aircraft performance based on these 
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factors plus the wind speed and direction along the selected route of flight.  SOFPARS 
will compute the direction, distance, effective airspeeds, enroute times, fuel burned, and 
fuel remaining at each turn point along the route of flight.  Turn points can be entered 
into the flight plan by pointing and clicking on the map presentations or by typing in the 
latitude and longitude or the Military Grid Reference System coordinates of the turn 
point.  Names of previously defined points like navigation aids, airfields, FAA 
checkpoints, and user defined points can be entered manually.  A turn point can also be 
defined as a specified range and bearing from a navigation aid; SOFPARS will use the 
coordinate position of the navigation aid, apply the distance and direction of the range 
and bearing, and compute the coordinate position of the new turn point trigonometrically.  
SOFPARS also incorporates inflight refueling missions by allowing the flight planner to 
add or delete available fuel at any turn point in the flight.  Flight planners can also enter a 
delay time at a turn point, subsequent fuel computations will reflect the delay time 
according to the airspeed, altitude, and burn rate.  The route of flight will display on the 
map presentation as the planner designs each leg.  SOFPARS flight planning functions 
enable flight planners to calculate routes of flight, save them, print them, and transfer 
them to floppy disks in formats that are compatible with aircraft mission computers.  This 
allows crew members to reduce the amount of time spent manually entering data at the 
aircraft prior to flight. 
      SOFPARS is also a mission planning tool for special operations aviation 
missions.  Mission planning differs from flight planning in one significant aspect; 
mission planning involves flight planning to avoid detection and engagement by 
adversary surface to air radars, missile systems, and anti-aircraft artillery pieces.  
SOFPARS depicts detection and engagement probabilities for specific surface to air 
threats as applied to specific aircraft by displaying color-coded rings on top of the map 
screen.  The radius of the rings is determined by the terrain elevation at the threat 
system’s location compared to the altitude of the aircraft, the characteristics of the threat 
system’s radar, and the size of the aircraft being analyzed.  By displaying these rings on 
the same presentation as the route of flight, an air planner can adjust the aircraft route to 
avoid or delay detection by adversary anti-aircraft threats.  SOFPARS also allows 
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planners to enter additional mission related information such as communication 
frequencies, parachute data for airdrop missions, and firing orbit parameters for AC-
130H/U profiles.  These features enable specialized aviation mission planners to 
consolidate most of the relevant mission related data in one system and electronically 
transfer mission data to aircrews. 
  
2. JSOAC Use of SOFPARS 
 
      Joint Special Operations Air Component planners could employ other aspects of 
SOFPARS to conduct command and control.  Special use airspace such as no fly zones, 
buffer zones, refueling tracks, orbit points, checkpoints, and other examples of airspace 
control measures can be defined and depicted on the SOFPARS map displays.  For 
example, multiple routes flown by different aircraft can be displayed on the same 
SOFPARS map.  SOFPARS will “fly” the routes based on take off or arrival times 
specified by the planner and then determine any potential conflicts vertical and lateral 
separation of aircraft.  This also allows commanders to visualize planned airflows, 
sequences of events, and alter routes to avoid potential midair collisions.   
      The rehearsal aspect of the SOFPARS system is less of an interactive process than 
it is a mission preview of segments of a flight route.  SOFPARS can display terrain, 
imagery, and map data from a variety of perspectives and the program can also 
incorporate motion into previews.  The SOFPARS operator defines field of view, angle 
of depression, lighting conditions, and elevation parameters and the selected view is 
shown in a window inset on the SOFPARS screen.  For example, imagery of a target 
building or helicopter landing zone can be loaded into the SOFPARS database and a 
prediction of the way the target or objective area would look on the aircraft’s sensors 
(synthetic aperture radar, infrared detection set, and\or low light television camera) from 
the planned direction and altitude.  These map insets can be printed as part of SOFPARS 
mission documents which the crews can carry with them inflight.  Aircrews can also 
virtually watch the view on a SOFPARS computer that they would see outside their 
cockpit as they flew along their route.  This feature allows crews to conduct in-depth 
 51
mission planning of landing zones, target areas, and difficult terrain features prior to 
actually flying their missions.   
      SOFPARS can also be useful to special operations mission planners during the 
execution phase of special operations aviation missions.  SOFPARS is configured to 
accept near real-time position reports of actual aircraft as they are flying.  Specific 
symbols representing these actual aircraft and their positions will display on the 
SOFPARS map.  SOFPARS will also display actual adversary systems as they are 
identified by threat detection systems such as J-STARS, AWACS, or other electronic 
surveillance platforms.  SOFPARS can simultaneously display the formations 
synthetically “flying” their planned routes of flight along with the near real-time actual 
aircraft positions.    The special operations air planners can visually track actual mission 
progress against the planned sequence of events more effectively than the current process 
of using a text-based execution checklist alone. 
      Visualizing aircraft positions in the command center can also reduce the time 
needed to respond to a combat search and recovery mission.  Joint doctrine and Special 
Operations doctrines both emphasize the requirement for forces to provide their own 
search and recovery procedures, processes, and techniques.  Every special operations 
mission includes a dedicated Personnel Recovery team that can include refueling tankers, 
helicopters, Special Tactics para-rescuemen, and Special Forces, Rangers, or SEALs to 
provide tactical security. Special operations Personnel Recovery Teams also have an 
organic command and control structure that is subordinate to the overall joint mission 
commander.  As such, the Personnel Recovery command and control element must 
develop, rehearse, and execute alternate recovery plans as part of the battlestaff.  During 
execution of a search and recovery mission, acquiring an accurate and reliable position is 
the critical event when an aircraft is shot down or has a inflight emergency that forces it 
to crash or land in hostile territory.  “Seeing” where a stricken aircraft was last reported 
on the SOFPARS map presentation as compared to where the aircraft was supposed to 
be, can greatly reduce the initial confusion associated with trying to determine which 
aircraft is missing and where to begin searching. 
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3. SOFPARS Summary  
 
SOFPARS enjoys an advantage over other potential command and control 
software systems a JSOAC might employ.  As a fielded system already in use by Air 
Force special operations aircrews, SOFPARS has evolved into a more robust and 
transportable computer system.  The capability to transfer flight and mission data from 
SOFPARS to the mission computers in each special operations aircraft is a key attribute 
of no other software system.  SOFPARS operates in the standard Windows operating 
system environment on laptop and desktop computers in networked or stand alone 
configurations.  While not a true simulation, SOFPARS offers the ability for aircrews and 
planners to conduct in-depth study of imagery and terrain features from various 
perspectives and representations.  Having a mental image of what an objective, whether it 
is a specific building or a landing zone, is expected to look like on night vision goggles, 
infrared detection set, or a low light level television could be critical during mission 
execution. 
However, because SOFPARS was designed to be a flight and mission-planning 
program, it does not include combat loss models.  There is no interaction between the 
aircraft and adversary threat systems loaded into the SOFPARS databases.  SOFPARS 
also lacks an analytical tool that compares the likely results of alternate courses of action. 
Yet, the ability to visualize alternate flight routes and formations can still aid special 
operations air planners in refining courses of action, particularly in deconflicting routes 
of flight. 
 
D. SUMMARY OF SOFTWARE SYSTEMS 
 
Software systems for the command and control of specialized aviation missions 
are integral enablers of the Theater JSOAC concept.  JSOAC planners could use such a 
computer system to model adversary and friendly courses of action.  Once a course of 
action is selected, the software system could be used to prepare the JSOAC as transfer 
generic flight paths, threat locations, and other mission data to home-based aircrews by 
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electronically transmitting the applicable files to each unit.  As changes in the mission 
data occur, the JSOAC staff could post the new information to a secure website and 
notify the aircrews that new data is available.  The aircrews would download the changes 
from the website, refine their individual routes of flight, and transmit the new routes back 
to the JSOAC.  The JSOAC would then deconflict the new routes and update the master 
plan.  This distributed form of mission planning with the Theater JSOAC staff controlling 
the master data file is the cornerstone of the Theater JSOAC operational concept. 
The three software systems introduced in this chapter represent a variety of 
modeling, simulation, and planning capabilities available to mission planners.  Each 
offers strengths and weaknesses as potential tools for the command and control of 
specialized aviation missions.  The Marine Air Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare 
Simulation focuses on Marine Corps air, land, and amphibious combat missions at an 
entity or combat unit level of detail.  Although some weapon systems from other services 
are included in the simulation, Marine Corps equipment predominates.  The Joint 
Conflict and Tactical System, on the other hand, includes weapon systems from all the 
services.  Furthermore, the JCATS combat simulation details combat units down to 
individual personnel and vehicles.  JCATS does allow planners to aggregate groups of 
weapons and personnel into dissimilar fighting units and task forces.  Both MTWS and 
JCATS are combat simulations that reduce the numbers and effectiveness of friendly, 
enemy, and neutral forces based on interactions between the forces in the wargames.  The 
Special Operations Forces Planning and Rehearsal System is a set of computer based 
flight and mission planning programs.  Since it is not a wargame like MTWS and JCATS, 
SOFPARS has a limited modeling capability.  Nor does SOFPARS, with the exception of 
surface-to-air radar and missile systems, include models of ground or naval weapon 
systems.  However, special operations aircrews already use SOFPARS as an authorized 
computerized flight and mission planning system.  As such, SOFPARS can readily be 
used to disseminate a common ground threat picture, airspace control measures, and 
detailed routes of flight among special operations air planners and aircrews. 
While MTWS and JCATS have more robust capabilities than SOFPARS in terms 
of casualty analysis for course of action comparison, SOFPARS flight deconfliction 
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program is a useful command and control tool.  A benefit all three programs share is an 
ability to synthetically “fly” planned air sorties and represent a mission progress with 
animation or motion.  MTWS and SOFPARS can also import near-real time aircraft 
position updates and superimpose them on the same map presentation with planned 
missions.  This capability for commanders to see where aircraft are versus where they 
were planned to be is a significant advantage over the current text-based checklist process 
currently used by special operations battlestaffs. 
These are not the only modeling, simulation, wargames, and flight planning 
programs available to special operations mission planners.  Nor are any of them 
specifically designed to serve as command and control tools as they apply to operational 
mission planning, rehearsal, and execution.  However, these three software systems 
adequately represent the range of functionality that future command and control software 
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VII.  A FRAMEWORK OF COMPARISON FOR  
COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
A. SOURCES OF CRITERIA 
 
Selecting a reasonable set of criteria becomes troublesome when trying to 
compare doctrinal concepts that are based on different sets of military capabilities.  
Although there are no perfect criteria for comparing doctrinal concepts, using universal 
qualities shared by the concepts under review and applying them objectively can lead to a 
practical solution.  This chapter outlines the steps taken to determine reasonable criteria 
to compare the JOPES and Time Sensitive Planning processes with the Theater JSOAC 
concept of operations. 
The Department of Defense does not have criteria to evaluate specialized aviation 
operational concepts.  Several likely candidates are available, however from both Joint 
and United States Air Force doctrine.  The principles of war as applied to United States 
military forces are one such example. These principles include objective, unity of 
command, offense, mass, economy of force, maneuver, surprise, security, and simplicity. 
(Joint Publication 1, 2000)  Since the operational concepts under review are based on 
employing United States military aviation forces, the principles published by the United 
States Air Force on aerospace power are also eligible criteria.  The principles of 
aerospace power include centralized control and decentralized execution, synergy, 
flexibility and versatility, priority, balance, concentration, and persistence (Air Force 
Doctrine Document-1, 1997).  Neither the United States Special Operations Command 
nor its subordinate commands with specialized aviation forces; the United States Army 
Special Operations Command and the Air Force Special Operations Command publish 
any specific principles or tenets applicable to the command and control of specialized 
aviation.   
A third source of possible criteria comes from the description of command and 
control processes known as Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action, or O-O-D-A 
loops.  The cycle of Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action describes the sequence 
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commanders and their staffs follow in apprising a military situation, determining possible 
responses to shape the strategic and tactical situations to their advantage, selecting a 
course of action to pursue, and finally arraying their forces and implementing the 
command decision.  The essence of the O-O-D-A loop concept is that the battle staff that 
can cycle through these loops more efficiently, in terms of accuracy and speed, will 
achieve an advantage over their opponents.  Applying combat power at a faster and more 
persistent battle tempo than an adversary can actually create a sense of paralysis in an 
enemy’s O-O-D-A process.  For example, if an adversary plans an action based on 
intelligence that indicates a particular force is going to be in a specific location for a 
given time, but that force advances its position then the adversary must re-enter the 
Observe phase of the O-O-D-A loop.  Whichever command staff can flow through the 
loop faster relative to their adversary’s speed will likely prevail (Boyd). 
 
B. THE SELECTED CRITERIA 
 
These principles of war and aerospace power published by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and United States Air Force Air Staff, respectively, offer potential criteria that, if 
applied appropriately, can be used as a framework for comparison of command and 
control concepts.  Recognizing these operational concepts are largely centered on 
command and control functions supports the relevance of the O-O-D-A loop concept as a 




Although other criteria may exist, there are three elements that stand out from the 
sources listed above as the most applicable in judging the viability of the way specialized 
aviation forces deploy and employ.  The three criteria are speed, conservation of forces, 
and operational security.  Speed can be thought of as responsiveness or timeliness of the 
entire military organization that forms in response to a contingency tasking.  Speed as it 
applies to evaluating operational concepts is the consistent ability to generate, and then 
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apply combat force to a mission in the least practical amount of time.  Speed is derived 
from the principles of war addressing offense and surprise, the Air Force principle of 
persistence, and the application of O-O-D-A loops.  Conservation of forces relates to the 
limited number of specialized aviation assets available in the Department of Defense 
inventory.  Once committed to a specific mission in a specific theater of operations, the 
aircraft, aircrews, maintenance, and support personnel are not available for use by other 
theater commands.  An operational concept that needlessly ties up these limited numbers 
of military aircrew and aircraft for extended periods of time is less attractive than an 
operational concept that delays the commitment to deploy and employ as long as 
practical.  Worldwide commitments of these “low-density, high-demand” capabilities 
make conservation of special forces imperative in general, and of specialized aviation 
forces in particular. Conservation of forces combines the principles of economy of force 
and mass, as well as the aerospace tenets of flexibility and versatility.  Finally, 
operational security is the third criteria.  Protecting one’s military capability from access 
by an adversary is fundamental to the success of any military operation. Operational 
security is a subset of the security principle of war. 
Since operational concepts are concerned with the length of time it takes to 
translate military potential into combat capability, speed becomes a measure of 
comparison to differentiate between operational concepts.  However, the question arises 
as to when to begin measuring the speed of a military response.  Special operations 
commanders cannot change the JOPES cycle, so the point at which the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff publishes a warning order is the same for either operational concept.  The end point 
for measuring responsiveness must also be determined. The time an execute order is 
published is not directly controlled by special operations commanders either.  However, 
the point at which special operations commanders report their forces are ready to be 
employed is a factor in determining when superior commanders issue an execute order.  
This point of readiness depends on the process used to assemble, plan, and rehearse the 
joint special operations task force.  Therefore, speed should be measured from the time a 
warning order is published to the time special operations commanders report their forces 
are prepared to execute their assigned mission. 
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2.  Conservation of Forces   
 
Conservation of forces is the second criteria.  From a macro perspective, the 
conservation of forces refers to the ability to provide forces for multiple contingencies 
within a relatively short time frame.  The term conservation of forces combines several 
concepts that include the ability to continue or maximize mission qualification training 
and also allow adequate maintenance preparation time to bring specialized aircraft from 
training capabilities to at least mission capable, and preferably mission ready status.  
Finally, the conservation of forces umbrella refers to a commander’s ability to remain 
flexible in controlling forces from pre-deployment throughout mission execution.  A 
variation of this aspect of conservation of forces is known as unity of command among 
airpower advocates in the United States Air Force.  In this instance, command flexibility 
is accomplished by maintaining visibility of the location and mission capability, of both 
aircraft, aircrew, maintenance support packages, and specialized aviation ground combat 
forces from the time the weapon systems are assigned to an emerging mission in a 
geographic theater.  An adequate degree of oversight enables commanders to respond to 
changes in the operational situation by reshaping the forces under his command, 
coordinating logistics and maintenance requirements enroute so aircraft arrive prepared to 
fly, or even by canceling their deployment prior to arriving in theater.  Conservation of 
forces then is seen both from the vantage point of the specialized aviation commanders at 
general in terms of preserving combat capability for other missions and from the point of 
view of a gaining operational commander in terms of in-transit visibility that supports 
operational flexibility. 
 
3. Operational Security 
 
Operational security is the third criteria used to compare alternate concepts of 
operation as applied to specialized airpower.  Operational security entails hiding, 
disguising, or dispersing forces and other measures taken to deny information regarding 
military intent from any party that is not part of a friendly chain of command.  
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Operational security relies on proactive defensive measures that are designed to frustrate 
intelligence-gathering efforts by adversaries, agencies sympathetic to anti-US initiatives, 
and can also defend against media inquiries.  Ideally, operational security measures are 
integrated throughout the deployment, employment, and redeployment phases of any 
military mission.  Typical operational security measures include, but are not limited to, 
using secure telephone and electronic mail communication means, shredding or 
safeguarding all written materials, enforcing prohibitions on classified discussions in 
non-secure areas, and even go so far as to include the removal of insignia and unit 
patches that identify specific mission capabilities.   
Another aspect of operational security involves what is known as a logistics 
“footprint”.  Whenever a military organization deploys to a forward operating area, some 
degree of interaction with the local population, particularly in instances of contracting 
activities with local vendors, occurs.  In many locations around the world, potable bottled 
water, electricity, aviation and vehicle fuel, hangar and office space, lodging, rental 
vehicles, food and sanitation services, et cetera must be purchased or rented to support 
the military mission.  The logistics personnel who arrange for these necessary items often 
arrive in advance of the operational, support, and maintenance forces in order to establish 
the work and living arrangements.  The number and type of contractual arrangements 
made to support the military force can be an indication of the size of the forces being 
deployed and the length of time they expect to be deployed.  Thus, the logistics 
“footprint” can be an indicator of operational capabilities or at least, an indication that a 




Speed, conservation of force, and operational security are the three criteria used to 
evaluate alternate operational concepts involving the deployment and employment of 
specialized aviation forces in this analysis.  The three elements are derived from 
published Department of Defense doctrine endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
United States Air Force Air Staff.  A widely accepted model of command and control 
 61
activities known as the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop is also a source for the selected 
criteria.  Although not all of the principles of war and tenets of aerospace power are used 
as bases of evaluation, these three offer a set of relevant and adequate criteria with which 
to proceed. 
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VIII.   COMPARISON OF TIME SENSITIVE PLANNING  
    AND THE THEATER JSOAC CONCEPT 
 
The proposed Theater JSOAC concept of operations represents a potential 
improvement over the JOPES and Time Sensitive Planning processes as a way in which 
specialized aviation forces are deployed and employed by the Department of Defense.  
Applying the three criteria identified in the previous chapter to evaluate these alternate 
methods of deploying and employing specialized aviation forces may yield some insight 
into the viability of adopting the Theater JSOAC concept.  Speed, conservation of forces, 
and operational security are characteristics of military missions that commanders and 
their staffs must consider whenever faced with employing combat capabilities.  
Commanders, however, have little empirical information with which to make such 
decisions.  The same is true when comparing operational and doctrinal concepts.  Rather, 
a qualitative judgment must be made based on the experience, instinct, and insight of 
those who compare the two concepts.  The following comparison of operational concepts 




Speed refers to the total time from when a crisis or contingency occurs to the time 
special operations aviation forces are prepared to execute their assigned missions.  In the 
case of the current sequential deployment and employment process, this total time 
includes phased segments.  These segments include high level JOPES planning and 
course of action analysis, pre-deployment activities at the unit level, deployment of 
aircraft, aircrews, and support forces, and finally planning, rehearsal, and mission 
execution phases.  Since both deployment processes depend on the same overarching 
JOPES process to run its course prior to initiating deployment actions, and since the 
proposed Theater JSOAC process does not alter the JOPES cycle, it is reasonable to 
assume the JOPES cycle would take the same amount of time to complete regardless of 
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which specialized aviation deployment process is in effect.  Therefore, the JOPES 
processing time is held constant.  Pre-deployment activities occur at the unit level and 
include actions such as recalling aircrew members and support personnel, ensuring 
individual mobility criteria are met for the personnel who are selected to deploy, and 
preparing aircraft for combat versus training missions.  Once aircraft maintenance repairs 
are completed, the aircraft generally do not fly again until the deployment order is issued.  
Again, both deployment methods would follow the same sequence so the time required to 
complete pre-deployment actions at home-stations would be the same for both the JOPES 
and Time Sensitive Planning and the Theater JSOAC concepts.   
The actual deployment of the aircraft would also be equal under both processes.  
The time it takes for an aircraft to fly from their home-station or for a helicopter to be 
packaged for shipment to a theater is the same in both cases.  However, an advantage in 
the speed of response is evident when comparing the planning, rehearsal, and execution 
elements.  In the sequential JOPES and Time Sensitive Planning process, these three 
elements do not occur until the aircraft and aircrews arrive in the theater of operation.  
Then, after a nominal 96 hours, special operations aircrews and ground forces would be 
ready to execute their assigned mission.  The advantage of the Theater JSOAC concept is 
that key members of the primary aircrews would conduct planning and some aspects of 
mission rehearsal from home-station while non-primary aircrews ferry the combat aircraft 
to the theater of operations.  The primary aircrews would then be flown to meet their 
special operations aircraft at the staging base.  Depending on the aircraft and distance to 
the theater, this parallel method of simultaneous deployment while planning and 
rehearsing could result in an increase in responsiveness.  The critical element in 
measuring speed in this context is not based on which method of deployment and 
employment takes less time in any singular case.  Specific deployment examples can be 
found demonstrating that a compressed version of the Time Sensitive Planning process 
could result in as fast a response as the Theater JSOAC process and vice versa.  Speed, in 
this context, is more appropriately considered as a relative comparison of the Time 
Sensitive Planning process and the Theater JSOAC processes, as they would likely be 
used in most crisis and contingency responses. 
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B. CONSERVATION OF FORCES 
 
Special operations forces in general, and specialized aviation forces in particular, 
are scarce resources.  Yet, in their contingency war plans, every regional theater lays 
claim to more specialized aviation forces than are assigned in their regions.  Central 
Command and Southern Command have the fewest assigned special operations aviation 
forces while Pacific Command has the most.  However, all the regional commanders 
expect special operations forces to be readily available when contingencies occur in their 
areas of responsibility.  This scarcity in the supply of special operations aircraft in the 
face of operational demands places a premium on conserving the overall supply of 
available specialized aviation forces.   
Conservation does not mean that commanders of special operations aircraft have 
the authority to deny those aircraft to theater commanders.  Rather, conservation implies 
preserving the availability of the weapon systems and aircrews as mush as practical prior 
to committing them to a specific theater of operations.  Once committed to one theater, 
the aircraft, aircrews, and support personnel fall under the sole operational command of 
the gaining theater commander.  When conflicts arise over the disposition of these forces, 
such as when two crises occur in different theaters at the same time, the respective theater 
commanders must confer with the Joint Staff and United States Special Operations 
Command to determine which special operations forces will be assigned to which theater 
commander.  While this situation does not occur often, the possibility of high demand, 
low density weapons systems like the EC-130 and AC-130 aircraft being requested by 
more than one theater command is a concern.  Assigned and attached special operations 
forces remain in theater until released by the theater commander.  As such, those aircraft 
and aircrews are not available for taskings to meet the mission requirements of other 
theater commanders when crises arise.  Conservation of forces should be viewed from the 
macro perspectives of the regional theater commanders as well as from the special 
operations force providers. 
 Both deployment and employment processes offer advantages in terms of 
conservation of forces.  The Time Sensitive Planning process ensures the gaining theater 
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commander, through the designated joint task force commander and JSOTF commander, 
can execute direct command and control of their assigned forces.  As a crisis evolves, 
having forces on hand supports a commander’s need to maintain operational flexibility.  
Under the JOPES and Time Sensitive Planning deployment process, special operations 
aircrew and aircraft would already be at the forward operating base, so theater 
commanders would not have to re-initiate the JOPES process to gain operational control 
of specialized aviation assets.  Conversely, theater commanders are not always quick to 
release special operations forces when a crisis stabilizes.  In the past, special operations 
force providers have made accommodations with theater commanders to conserve 
specialized aviation forces.  For example, aircraft could be authorized to return to their 
home station while the theater commander retained tasking authority over those aircraft.  
Basically, special operations commanders agree to remain on an alert status while at 
home station in exchange for the opportunity to conduct maintenance upgrades on their 
aircraft, reconstitute and train their aircrews, and rotate support personnel.  This 
arrangement is a compromise for the theater commander because the aircraft would have 
to fly back to the theater before a new planning and execution cycle could begin.  On the 
other hand, the theater commander retains operational command of a specified number of 
aircraft and aircrews throughout the redeployment at home station, so there would be no 
requirement to initiate the JOPES process to return the aircraft to the theater.  Theaters 
which keep scarce specialized aviation forces deployed in theater on a contingency basis 
must balance their operational requirements with the need to reconstitute special 
operations aviation capabilities for use by other theater commanders.   
The proposed Theater JSOAC deployment and employment process supports 
conservation of specialized aviation forces from the points of view of theater 
commanders and special operations force providers.  Theater commanders would gain 
operational control of the mission aircrews for planning and rehearsal purposes during the 
initial stages of a contingency or crisis.  In addition to receiving a more situationally 
aware and better prepared set of aircrews if a contingency response ultimately results in a 
deployment order, the proposed process also allows theater commanders to exercise 
flexibility prior to bringing forces into the theater.  As a group, the regional theater 
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commanders potentially gain the benefit of access to mission aircrews sooner in the crisis 
and contingency response cycle.  It would be possible for different aircrews to plan 
different missions for different theater commanders from the same home station under the 
Theater JSOAC process.  Depending on the number of aircraft required for such multiple 
missions, either one or all of the deployments could be supported. If however, one crisis 
resolved itself and no longer required an aircraft deployment, the other missions would 
not have suffered for a lack of aircrew and aircraft prior to beginning mission planning.  
By integrating detailed planning activities as soon as practical following the National 
Command Authority decision to employ special operations forces, Theater JSOAC 
planners retain the option to initiate aircraft deployment when it is appropriate based on 
the developing crisis.  In situations where a crisis unfolds rapidly, the Theater JSOAC 
process allows for aircraft movement and mission planning to begin right away.   
On the other hand, if a crisis appears to stabilize prior to issuing deployment 
orders, special operations aircrews would have remained at home station and therefore be 
available to respond to other theater commanders’ requirements.  The Time Sensitive 
Planning process would result in aircraft movement and, therefore, commitment to a 
single theater commander even prior to extensive mission planning occurring.  Once in 
theater, the aircraft and aircrews would remain in place, and unavailable to other theater 
commanders, until the crisis is resolved or the special operations force is re-deployed.  
So, from the perspective of special operations force providers at United States Special 
Operations Command, United States Army Special Operations Command, and Air Force 
Special Operations Command, the Theater JSOAC deployment and employment process 
allows the same number of aircrews and aircraft to support operational theater 
commanders more so than the Time Sensitive Planning process does. 
 
C. OPERATIONAL SECURITY 
 
Operational security is a cornerstone of success in special operations missions.  
Since both methods of employment and deployment rely on secure communications 
between theater-based command and control staffs and home based aircrews, the risk to 
 67
overall security from a communications breach is the same for Time Sensitive Planning 
and the new Theater JSOAC proposal.  However, communications are not the only 
source of military capability related information that commanders must secure. 
Another aspect of operational security extends to indicators of the size and 
capability of a military force that an adversary or their sympathizers may notice.  Such 
information includes the amount of water purchases, the number and duration of lodging 
reservations, and additional security measures at airfields in areas or countries that are 
near to crisis regions.  These and several other arrangements are critical to supporting 
special operations personnel as they prepare to execute combat missions.  Unfortunately, 
they are also indicators of military presence and, indirectly, of the likely size and 
composition of those forces.   
The current Time Sensitive Planning process requires a physical location at or 
near an airfield for special operations forces to assemble while planning, rehearsal, and 
preparation occurs.  Ideally, this forward operating base, also known as an intermediate 
staging base, would be located within the operational flight range of the special 
operations aircraft in relation to the objective area.  The longer the special operations 
aircraft and personnel remain at the staging base, the greater the risk that an adversary 
will become aware of their presence.  Even though such an adversary may not know the 
exact special operations mission plan, an adversary might take additional security 
measures based on the knowledge that a military force is within range.  These additional 
precautions could complicate the nature of the crisis and reduce the chances for a 
successful special operations mission.  Granted, under the Time Sensitive Planning 
process, the nominal duration of a special operations contingent would only be 
approximately eight days; 96 hours for planning and preparation with two days to prepare 
the force reception and another one or two days to close down the staging base following 
the departure of the main force. 
The Theater JSOAC concept for employing and deploying special operations 
aviation assets could help alleviate many of the operational security issues related to 
staging bases.  Where practical, assembling aviation forces at airfields with an existing 
military force prior to launching the execution phase could help mask the presence of a 
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special operations aviation force.  Establishing a recovery base closer to the objective 
area immediately prior to executing the mission, would also limit exposure in the forward 
area.  However, if a suitable airfield with a military presence is not available, the overall 
time spent at the staging base could be reduced under the Theater JSOAC proposal.  By 
arriving at the staging base with much of the preliminary planning and some portion of 
the rehearsal already accomplished, less total time would be needed for the aircrews to 
reach the execution phase.  Establishing split staging bases is another approach to 
mitigating the risk to operational security.  Since the Theater JSOAC concept integrates 
distributed mission planning from the theater to home based forces (in effect, establishing 
command and control of geographically separated units), coordinating a special 
operations mission that originates from multiple staging bases would be easier than 
attempting to do so under the Time Sensitive Planning process.  A corresponding 
reduction in support requirements at each staging base would further lower the risk of 
compromise or detection of a special operations force located within range of an 
objective area.  Furthermore, if special operations aircraft and the personnel who fly and 
support them are deployed to staging or recovery bases for a shorter duration, then the 




The current special operations deployment process rates well against all three 
criteria and enjoys the credibility of having been successfully employed on real world 
operations since its adoption in the late 1980’s.  Yet, from a qualitative point of view, the 
Theater JSOAC proposal for deploying and employing specialized aviation rates better 
when compared to the same criteria.  Although untested, this new concept offers the 
potential for special operations commanders to react to crises faster while conserving the 
overall availability of finite specialized aviation assets and reducing some operational 
security concerns.  The Time Sensitive Planning process provides a rapid reaction 
capability for theater commanders as compared to the time it would take to assemble, 
train, plan, rehearse, and execute a mission using a conventional task force of a similar 
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size and composition.  But, given the anticipated global environment with the near 
complete diffusion of worldwide information resources and media access, the 
requirement for military forces to respond faster, with fewer forces, while maintaining a 
sufficient degree of security is becoming critical to success in future special operations 
missions.  Therefore, based on a qualitative view of these criteria, the new Theater 
JSOAC proposal for deploying and employing special operations aviation capabilities, 
should it prove technologically, organizationally, and doctrinally feasible, warrants 
further analysis. 
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IX. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Enabling the Theater JSOAC proposal as presented in this thesis requires more 
than modeling and simulation capabilities.  Other technological developments would be 
incorporated into standing theater-based Joint Special Operations Air Component 
Commands.  These new technologies address some of the same capabilities raised by the 
analysis of existing wargames in the previous chapter.  For example, an ability to share 
the same data virtually across extended networks and geographic distances could 
potentially result in a more complete understanding of events that impact mission 
success.  Also, an ability to communicate simultaneously between theater-based mission 
planners and aircrews at their home stations could reduce the overall mission planning 
time.  Planners and aircrews would not have to wait for a series of messages, whether 
they are distributed electronically or otherwise, and then attempt to correlate proposals 
from other agents in sequential mission planning process.  There are other aspects related 
to implementing this new deployment and employment concept. 
 
A. POTENTIAL ISSUES  
 
Organizational changes would have to accompany the doctrinal changes 
associated with this new way of bringing specialized aviation to bear in operational 
missions.  These organizational changes would have to occur across special operations 
agencies from special operations headquarters, force providers, and force employers.  
United States Special Operations Command has already identified the manning 
requirements for theater-based Joint Special Operations Air Component Commands.  
However, finding personnel with the appropriate operational, planning, and educational 
experiences in specialized aviation missions may well be a challenge.  Also, defining 
professional career paths for the personnel assigned to future Joint Special Operations Air 
Component Commands would help secure an ongoing source of capable planners and 
commanders for these theater staffs.  These are some personnel related issues this concept 
would raise. 
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There are also logistical issues to address.  A subtext of this concept is the 
ferrying of mission aircraft by non-mission aircrews, in the case of fixed wing aircraft, 
and deploying rotary wing aircrews separate from their helicopters.  Logistical concerns 
arise when repairs need to be made while enroute to or at the staging bases.  Should 
maintenance personnel fall under the command of the Joint Special Operations Air 
Component, the JSOTF Logistics and Maintenance staff, or should they remain the 
responsibility of the deploying unit?  This question is key when one accepts the rationale 
that the benefit of ferrying aircraft is negated if the aircraft is not able to fly the 
operational mission when it arrives in theater.  Another logistics issue relates to the 
movement of the non-mission aircrews, support staffs, and maintenance support from 
home bases directly to recovery fields as a mission execution unfolds.  It is entirely 
possible that this demand on airlift resources could make the overall operational concept 
untenable.   
Under this new concept, aircrews at their home stations would fall under the 
operational command of a theater Joint Special Operations Air Component Command 
prior to deploying.  Currently, home station planners coordinate with, but do not work for 
forward based command and control structures.  There is a potential for friction between 
the requirements of the commander “over there” and the commander “right here” that 
could work to undermine the benefit of mission planning and preparation while awaiting 
deployment.  For example, a common sense of mission focus and urgency is easier to 
develop among the personnel who live and work together as they prepare for combat 
missions.  Preparing in isolation from their counterparts while also facing the influences 
of professional and personal responsibilities at home might diminish the benefits this 
concept offers.   
The sub-unified theater Special Operations Commands would also experience 
changes.  Shifting from the current focus on regional engagement and exercise 
management to conducting the command and control of specialized aviation assets would 
require a change in mindsets and resourcing.  Currently, only the commander of the 
Special Operations Command, Pacific also serves as the standing commander of an 
operational theater task force. As such, this officer maintains a combat oriented command 
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and control capability that includes a joint operations center and the expertise in assigned 
personnel to conduct command and control of special operations and assigned 
conventional forces in Pacific theater.  Other commanders of theater Special Operations 
Commands have the authority to act as JSOTF commanders when they form in response 
to a crisis or contingency.  However, they do not maintain a continuing capability to 
conduct operational command and control of special operations forces in their theaters.   
Resourcing the implementation of any new military capability or in this case, 
doctrinal change, eventually comes down to one question: where will the funding come 
from?  Although relatively few hardware purchases (possibly computers and 
communication upgrades) would be needed to resource this concept, several indirect 
costs could be associated with its implementation.  Manning and personnel related costs, 
for example, could increase at theater Special Operations Commands as additional 
personnel are assigned at these locations on permanent change of station orders.  Flying 
hour programs, which are the indexes for Operations and Maintenance funding in the 
United States Air Force, might be affected by the frequency of aircraft deployments for 
exercises and contingencies under this new scheme. 
 
D. ADDITIONAL AREAS OF RESEARCH 
 
Fortunately, the Department of Defense has a process in place to field new 
technologies, operational concepts, and develop doctrines prior to employing them in 
crises and contingencies.  United States Joint Force Command’s J-9 Division is 
responsible for what is known as Joint Experimentation.  The J-9 Division is currently 
addressing three command and control concepts that could enable the new operational 
concept proposed in this thesis.  The three concepts under review are Joint Interactive 
Planning, Common Relevant Operational Picture, and Adaptive Joint Command and 
Control (US Joint Forces Command-J9, 2000).   
       Joint Interactive Planning as envisioned by the Experimentation Directorate will 
enable decision-making and implementation at an operational level faster than an 
adversary.  This is accomplished by sequencing from a serial decision making process to 
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a more parallel one.  Automated decision support software, collaborative communication 
tools, intelligent software agents, and operationalizing the use of models and simulations.  
Joint Interactive Planning relies on assured and reliable availability to a Global 
Information Grid to provide both the communication links and common situational 
awareness of battlespace elements (US Joint Forces Command-J9, 2000). 
This common situational awareness is the foundation of the second concept the 
Experimentation Directorate is analyzing.  The Common Relevant Operational Picture is 
more of a tailorable menu of information choices than it is a single presentation of 
combat related data.  Users are able to choose the information relevant for the roles they 
fulfill in planning and executing a combat mission.  For example, the planner who is 
responsible for logistics issues would less likely be concerned with viewing an enemy 
order of battle presentation overlaid with a weather depiction.  On the other hand, that 
same logistician might be keenly interested in the weather conditions and forecasts at 
maintenance depots in the theater.  The Common Relevant Operational Picture seeks to 
capitalize on advances in data fusion and information management techniques to evolve 
existing Department of Defense Service sponsored databases and the Global Command 
and Control System into an integrated, all source “virtual information warehouse” (US 
Joint Forces Command-J9, 2000). 
      Adaptive Joint Command and Control reflects a re-organization of joint task force 
command and control structures.  Small, flexible, and mobile command echelons would 
deploy to forward areas and rely on secure, long range communications via the Global 
Information Grid to exchange operational information with their parent command and 
control organization in garrison.  These small command and control units would take 
advantage of Joint Interactive Planning capabilities and the Common Relevant 
Operational Picture to execute their missions (US Joint Forces Command-J9, 2000). 
The command and control of specialized aviation forces should adapt to 
incorporate the changes in the operational, technological, and organizational 
environments of the current age.  Operationally, responsiveness may well be the critical 
aspect that determines whether a special operations mission succeeds.  But 
misunderstandings of what the mission is and what the assembled force can accomplish, 
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caused by focusing on speed of maneuver, may also risk mission success.  Technological 
advances in communications and computing power offer the possibility for improved 
mission planning and rehearsal without having to physically assemble the task force and 
fly aircraft.  Also, smaller, forward-based command elements are capable of controlling 
widely dispersed special operations forces as a result of the same technological advances.  
The parallel planning, synthetic rehearsal, and split command and control elements of the 
proposed operational concept are not unique to specialized aviation missions.  In fact, 
Pacific Command, Special Operations Command, Pacific, and Joint Forces Command are 
three organizations within the Department of Defense who are already exploring ways to 
leverage similar operational, technological, and organizational opportunities with their 
respective military missions and capabilities.    
      The operational concept proposed in this thesis is a theory, and like most theories 
it has strengths and weaknesses.  This thesis has explored these potential benefits and 
risks from a descriptive and qualitative perspective.  It is not an exhaustive and 
quantitative analysis because this we do not have the experiential data that can only be 
derived from actually implementing the concept.  There may well be other factors that 
testing this theory may reveal, both positive and negative, that were not addressed in this 
thesis. As such, this concept is not mature enough to be considered a doctrine for the 
command and control of specialized aviation forces. 
      However, this operational concept may have peaked the interest of those 
responsible for developing special operations doctrine and those charged with 
commanding specialized aviation missions.  To that end, I would suggest that this theory 
merits further exploration and sponsorship by the special operations community.  In order 
to determine its usefulness, this proposed concept should be included in the Joint Forces 
Command exercise and experimentation cycle.  There, any improvements in joint 
warfighting capabilities resulting in this new operational concept, as they apply to the 
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APPENDIX A: THEATER JSOAC INFORMATION FLOWS 
 
The vice commander of the Air Force Special Operations Command 
commissioned an analysis of existing command and control architecture entitled 
“AFSOC’s Command and Control Information Requirements” (1998).  The goal was first 
to establish the baseline of all the processes and technologies employed across the 
breadth of command activities in a joint special operations air component.  These 
activities range from weather forecasting, keeping track of aircraft maintenance status, 
reporting on aircrew readiness, and collecting intelligence information, among other 
actions.  The second aspect of the analysis was to establish the requirements for an 
overarching command and control network or “system of systems” to link the identified 
command functions.  The resulting report identified many of the internal and external sets 
of information flows associated with a special operations aviation component.   
These information flows were presented in the report in relation to the DoD 
functional staffs organization separated by personnel, administration, intelligence, 
operations, communications, logistics, etc. within the command cell.  The diagram at 
Figure 11 depicts this structure and the components of a typical joint special operations 
air component command and control cell.  Pertinent external agencies such as the Joint 
Force Special Operations Component Commander, the Joint Task Force Air Operations 
Center, weather, intelligence, and home station units are included, as well.  Since special 
operations aviation missions are primarily flown to support special operations ground 
units, these ground elements, Mission Planning Authorities, are included in the diagram, 
also.  Functions within the operations section are further delineated to more clearly 
illustrate the information flows related to planning and conducting operational missions.  
The operations division is generally the central staff in an aviation command and control 
cell and therefore, it generates the bulk of the information flows. 
The report’s analysis of the existing command and control architecture revealed 
there was little commonality among the separate computer and communications systems 
being used by AFSOC special operations command and control staffs.  This lack of 
interoperability was due to systems designs that did not include requirements to share 
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data between computer programs used by different staff functions.  For example, 
intelligence related database and analysis software tools were not initially designed to 
integrate adversary threat system status and location information with flight and mission 
planning programs.  The report recommended an integrating approach that links the 
existing computer systems while accommodating new technologies.  This proposed 
architecture, as depicted in Figure 12, is a modification of the client-server computer 
topology model in which individual software programs, the clients, are connected to a 
secure local area network within the special operations air component.   A set of 
communication and processing computers called servers, route voice, video, and text data 
and provides access to external communication links.  In essence, the analysis on 
AFSOC’s report focuses on improving the communications infrastructure associated with 
conducting command and control, rather than identifying requirements to improve the 
individual computer based processes that are used to accomplish command and control. 
The report effectively illustrates the range of information flows that occur within 
a command and control organization that conduct special operations aviation activities.  
Its recommendations reflect a Joint Special Operations Air Component commander’s 
complete staff responsibilities ranging from administration, personnel, communications, 
maintenance, and logistics.  The report does not delve into the individual computer 
systems and software programs used within the staff sections.  Rather, the emphasis is 
placed on integrating the information flows within and between the various agencies 
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Figure 11.  Typical Joint Special Operations Air Component Structure From  
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 Figure 12.  AFSOC/JSOAC Future Command and Control Architecture From  
AFSOC’s Command and Control Information Requirements, 1998 
 
igure 12.  Proposed Command and Control Structure of Spe ialized Aviation
Organizations From AFSOC’s Command and Control Information 
Requirements, 1998 
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